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THE THEORY OF THE QUOTA IN PROPOR-
TIONAL REPRESENTATION—I.
Errata.
§25.—The last three lines should read :
'' X, I/, z, ... the seats obtained by the parties with the
method of apportionment actually used.
p', q', r' . . respectively equal to xQ, yQ, zQ . . . ,
so that
—
2^'
-^ q^ -\- r^ + . . = p -t q \- r -\- . , ^= V
.''
§26.— The second senteuce should read:
" The method of apportionment actually used gives x, y^
z . . . seats to the parties, and this allotment is equivalent
to taking the strengths of the parties to he yl, q', r' . .
^
instead A the actual p, q, r . . . , and allotting seats by the
rule of three in proportion to p\ q'^ r' . . .
"
§36.—The second paragraph should read :
" Regarded thus, the allotment may be considered ideal if
the number of members divided by the number of votes is
as nearly as possible the same for each party. This condition
is expressible in the form that
S T- _ ^V
shall be a minimum. This expression can be written in the
form
S (
P' ~
^y = k^ .... (^7)."
N'ote.
In "the comparison in §§9-*21 of the Hare aud Droop
quotas in a contest between two parties it is supposed that
all transfers of votes are made exactly in accordant;e with
the rule of three This is so in the rules of the Tasmanian
Electoral Act of 1907 (subject to the unimportant detail
that fractional remainders are neglected), and consequently
the argument of §§9-2I is correct for these rules. The
argument is not necessarily correct for rules such as those
of the English Municipal Representation Bill of 1907, in
which exact proportion is not used in all the transfers.
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1, It is the object of the various systems of proportionar
representation to secure, in the words of J. S. Mill, that
" every or any section shall be represented, not dispro-
portionately, but proportionately."
If it is necessary to divide a country into a number of
constituencies, the only way to secure proportional repre-
sentation with certainty is to ensure that in every constit-
uency each party is represented in proportion to the num-
ber of its supporters in that constituency. The adoption
of any other electoral system must make the representation
depend on the accident of the distribution of the parties
among the constituencies. (^)
The division of a country into single-member constit-
uencies will usually produce disproportionate representa-
tion, even if the member for each constituency is elected
by a majority of the voters in the constituency, (^) for the
representation of either party will depend on the number
of constituencies in which it is in a majority, and this
(') J. Rooke Corbett, Recent Electoral Statistics (a paper read before
the Manchester Statistical Society in 1906, and re-printed with additional
statistics by the Proportional Representation Society in 1910).
C) The j-esults of the seven General Elections held in the United King-
dom from 1885 to 1910 are shown by the following- table. Uncontested
constituencies are allowed for by assuming that the strength of each party
varied in them from one election to another in Ihe same ratio as in the
contested constituencies in the same county. Liberals include Labour and
Irish IVationalist members, Conservatives include Liberal Unionists :—
General Elections, United Kingdom, 1885-1910.
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number will not usually be proportionate to the strength
of the party throughout the country. (^)
2. Proportionate representation accordingly cannot be
ensured except from constituencies returning many mem-
bers. In such constituencies the disproportion of the repre-
sentation will not be diminished, but will rather be exag-
gerated, if each elector votes for all the candidates. (*)
It is accordingly necessary to use some system which will
produce proportionate representation ; and in each system
the quota has an important influence in determining how
exact shall be the proportion of representation to strength
of party.
3. In this paper the quota is considered in respect of the
two following classes of proportional representation
systems :—
(a) Single transferable-vote systems (varieties of which
are used in Tasmania, Denmark, and South
Africa)
;
(b) Party-list systems (varieties of which are used in
Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and
other European countries).
4. A representative assembly has usually to govern as
well as to represent; and government is usually carried on
by the party system, which requires that the party in
power shall have more than a nominal majority in the
representative body. Electoral statistics show that when
(*) This was seen in America about a hundred years ago, when the
Republicau party in Massachusetts introduced the plan known as the
"g-erryniander," since practised with much succesi in other countries.
"The g'errymander is simply such a thoufjhtful construction of districts as
will economise the votes of the party in power by giving it small majorities
in a large number of districts, and coop up the opposing party with over-
whelming majorities in a small number of districts." (Commons, Pro-
portional Reprcsetitation, p. 50.) It may be noted that it would be easy
to divide Tasmanin into single-member constituencies which, on the
voting at the (-Jeneral Election of 30th April, 1912, would return 23 mem-
bers for one party and 7 for the other ; the representation to which their
respective strengths entitled ihem was 16'3 and 13'7, and these numbers
were produced as nearly as possible (16 and 14) at the election, which
was held under the single transferable-vote system of the Electoral Act,
1907, in five districts each returning 6 members.
C) The most striking example in recent years is the election for the
Australian Senate held on 13th April, 1910, each of the six States being a
single constituency returning tliree members, and each elector voting for
three candidates. The Labor party, which polled 2,021,000 votes out of
4,018.000, secured all 18 seats, although in proportion lo its strength it was
not entitled to more than 10.
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there are two parties they are frequently nearly equal in
strength. (^) It is therefore important to compare the
various systems and quotas in regard to the size of the
majority they are likely to produce in close contests.
[^) Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, ((1), Table I.), has tabulated the results of the
seven General Elections held in the United Kingdom according to the four
kingdoms, and, in England, according to the ten divisions used by the
Registrar-General. These divisions contain constituencies returning from
29 to 70 members. From this tabulation I have computed that in Eng-
land for the 10 divisions at the 7 elections (70 occasions in all), the larger
party exceeded 60 °o of the votes on only five occasions, and its greatest
strength was 64 "/© ; the averaa^e for the 70 occasions was 55 "/o. In
Wales the strength of the larger party varied from 58 °/o to 68 <*/©, and the
average was 63 %. In Scotland the strength varied from 50 "/o to 61 **/©,
and the average was 56 "/q. In Ireland the strength varied from 67 "/o to
74
"/o, and the average was 70 "/o. For the whole of the United Kingdom,
the strength of the larger party at the seven elections was 56, 51, 52, 51,
61, 58, 54 °/o ; the average was 53 **/o.
Mr. Corbett states on the authority ^)f Mr. J. H. Humphreys that at
the General Election of 1910, there were majorities of under 500 in 144
constituencies. The average number of voters in a constituency was about
10,000.
In Tasmania the strengths of the parties at the elections of 1909, 1910
(House of Representatives) and 30th April, 1912 in the five six-member
constituencies, and in the whole of Tasmania, were :
Tasmania—Strength of Parties, 1909, 1910, 1912.
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From this point of view the most important matter is
that the constituencies shall each return an odd number of
members. This may be illustrated by the following table,
based on the Tasmanian General Election of 30th April,
1912, which shows, (A) the actual representation given by
the six-member districts, and (B) what would probably have
been the representation if the districts had returned five
members each, or (G) seven members each.
Tasmania-
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ister of Finance. C^) At about the same time, Mr. Thomas
Hare, whose well-known book, The Election of Representa-
tives, Parliamentary and Municipal, was published in
1857, advocated a similar system in England.
Both Andrae and Hare used as the quota the number
obtained on dividing the number of votes polled in the con-
coustituency by the number of members to be elected from
the constituency. This quota is commonly called the Hare
quota. It was used in the Tasmanian Electoral Act of
1896, under which elections were held in the constituencies
of Hobart and Launceston for the House of Assembly iu
1897 (^) and 1900, and throughout Tasmania for the
Senate and House of Representatives in 1900. (^)
7. In 1868 Mr. H. R. Droop, in his pamphlet On
Methods of Electing Represe?itatives,{^) proposed as the
quota the number obtained by dividing the number of
votes by one more than the number of members to be
elected, and adding 1.
This quota is used in the Tasmanian Electoral Act of
1907, under which the General Elections for the House of
Assembly on 30th April, 1909, (i°) and 30th April,
1912, (^^) have been held. It is also used in the election
of members of the Senate of the Union 'of South Africa
and in municipal elections in the Transvaal. (^^)
8. In the case of a constituency of 4200 voters, electing
six members, the Hare quota is one-sixth of 4200 (or 700)
;
the Droop quota is one more than one-seventh of 4200
<or 601).'
Considering an election as a contest between individual
candidates, it is clear that a candidate who obtains, in
(•) See JReports from His Majesty's Representatives in Foreign
Countries and in British Colonies respecting the Application of the
Priticiple of Proportional Bepresentation to Public Electioyis. (Cd.
3501 — House of Commons, Miscellaneou?, No. 3, 1907), p. 17.
(') See R. M. Johnston, Observations on the Working Besults, of the
Hare System of Election in Tasma?iia, Fap. and Proc. Roy. Soc. Tas.,
1897, pp. 69-96.
(8) See Report on the Hare-Clark System of Voting, by J. G. Davies
and R. M. Johnston, presented to tlie Senate, 13th December, 1901
(reprinted in Beports from. His Majesty's Representatives, Js'e., pp. 96-
105).
(•) London, Macmillan, 1868 ; see also the seme author's paper in
Journal of the Statistical Society, June, 188 1.O See P. C Douglas, E. L. "Piesse, and W. A. B. Pirchall, Tasmania
— General Election for House of Assembly, April 30, 1909—Beport on
the System of Proportional Bepresentation used in accordance with the
Electoral Act, 1907 (Tasmania, No. 34 of 1909) .
(") See H. E. Packer, E. L. Piesse, and J. F. Daly. Report on the
General Election of 30th April. 1912 (Tasmania, No. 11 of 1912).
('') See John H, Humphreya, Transvaal— Proportional Bepresenta-
tion—Beport on the Municipal Elections held at Pretoria and Johannes-
burg on 27th October, 1909 (Transvaal, T.G. 5 -'10).
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the instance just given, the Droop quota (601 votes) has
more votes than each of six other candidates can obtain,
and therefore he has sufi&cient votes to entitle him to elec-
tion. Even if the Hare quota is used, any candidate who
obtains the Droop quota must be elected, and a candidate
who obtains the Hare quota receives an excess of votes
which are not really required by him, and which are there-
fore wasted. Hence it is clear that considering an election
as a contest between candidates the Droop quota is to be
preferred to the Hare quota. (^^)
(") See Douglas, Piesse, and Birchall, (10), p. 4, where the following
passage is quoted fi-om Propurtional Reprcsrnfation in Large Con-
stituencies by Walter Baily (London, Ridgway, 1872) : —
" We have still to consider what is the sufficient number of votes to be
retained for each candidate. The rule in use in Denmark (and adopted by
Mr. Hare, for finding this num^ier, which is called the quota), is to divide
the number of votes by the number of members to be elected. This is
simple, but still it is wrong. For example, if we ap])ly Mr, Hare's plan to
an election of two members, in which lUO votes are given — 70 for A first,
and then B, and 30 for r*—we should obtain the quota by dividing 100 by
2 ; and then retaining this quota of 50 votes for A^ we should hand over
20 votes to B \ and the votes would then stand, ^1 50, C 30, B 20, and
therefore we should have A and /^'elected. And yet it is clear that, as 70
ia more than twice 30. A and B should have been the candidates elected.
**The number of votes to be retained for a candidate must be enough to
make his election certain, whatever combination may be made of the other
votes given in the election. The smallest number which will suffice for
this is the true quota ; all votf^s retained beyond this number are wasted.
There is no difficulty in finding this number. Suppose that two members
ha"e to be elected, we must retain for a candidate votes enough to insure
his being one of the first two, and this we shall do if we retain for him just
over a third of the whole niimber of votes given. It is impossible for three
persons each to have mf»re than one-third of the votes, so that any candi-
date who has more than one-third by ever so little is certain to be one of
the first two, in whatever way the rest of the votes may be distributed.
In the same way, we see that if five members have to be elected, a candi-
date who has more than one-sixth of the votes will certainly be one of the
first five, and therefore elected ; and so for any other number of members.
The rule, then, for finding the true quota is this : Divide the number of
votes by the number just above that of the members to be elected, and take
as a quota the number just above the quotient.
" In the example given above, the true quota just exceeds one-third of
100. It is therefore 34. The 70 votes given to A^ B, will then be divided
into 34 for A, 34 for B, and 2 over. C has only 30 votes ; and the result
is that A and B are elected, and it is clear they should be.
'* It will be obsei'ved that some votes are wasted. This must needs be,
whatever mode of election is adopted. It a constituency has only one
member, a candidate who gets a bare majority will be elected, and it will
be of no moment whether the remaining votes ace for him or against him.
All except tlie bare majority can have no effisct upon the deletion, and may
be consideied as wasted. I3ut as the number of members is increased, the
unavoidable waste is diminished. With five members the effective votes
for each will just exceed one-sixth, and therefore the waste votes will just
fall short of the remaining sixth ; in fact, the unavoidable waste will always
just fall short of the true quota."
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9. We have next to compare the two quotas in a con-
test between parties. Messrs. Douglas, Piesse, and Birch-
all, in their report on the Tasmanian General Election of
30th April, 1909, (^*), discuss this aspect as follows:—
But these arguments do not decide the supeiioiitj' of one
quota over the other if an election is considered, not as |a
contest between candidates, but as a contest between parties.
For here we have to consider the possibility of one or more
candidates of a party securing election on less than a quota,
and so obtaining for their party an amount of representation
in excess of its proportional share. With the Hare quota it
is very easy for a party to secure excessive representation by
returning several candidates with less than the quota. With
the Droop quota this is impossible in a two-party contest
(except when papers become exhausted through the neglect
of voters to give a preference to each candidate of their
party), and in a contest between more than two parties dis-
proportional representation would probably occur much less
frequently with the Droop quota than with the Hare quota.
Take the case of an election of six members by 210 voters,
63 of whom belong to party A, and 147 to party B, and
assume the Hare quota is used. Party A, having roughly
one-third of the voters, is entitled to two members, and party
B to four. When all candidates but seven have been excluded,
the state of the poll might be that the five remaining candi-
dates of party B had respectively 30, 30, 29, 29, 29 votes
each (total 147) ; and the two remaining candidates of party
A 35 and 28 each (total 63). The candidate lowest, on the
poll has now to be excluded ; that is, the A candidate with
28 votes is excluded, and there are left six candidates—five
of party B, and one of A, who are declared elected. That is,
party A^ instead of getting two members, has got only one
;
and party B, instead of four members, has got five.
Now this has happened solely because the use of the Hare
quota (35) has wasted the four votes which the A candidate,
with 35 votes, had in excess of the Droop quota (31). If the
Droop quota had been used, this surplus of four would have
been distributed before the exclusion of the lowest candidate.
It would naturally have gone to the other candidate of the
party, whose votes would thus have been raised from 28 to
32 ; and the candidate excluded as lowest on the poll would
then have been one of the B candidates. Thus, the result
would have been the correct result
—
party A, two members
;
party B, four members.
It is interesting to note in passing that if, in the election
for Franklin, the Hare quota had been used, and if there
had been no cross-voting between the candidates of the Labour
Party and other candidates by voters who gave their first
preferences to Non-labour candidates, and no exhaustion of
the papers of such voters, the Labour Party would have
secured only one member in place of the two to whom it was
entitled in proportion to the number of its supporters.
There are also some cases in which the Droop quota
produces representation not proportionate to the strengths
('*) See (TO), p. 5.
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of the two parties. Thus, in a contest in a six-member
constituency between two parties, one of which polls
72 % of the votes, the other 28%, the first party
has five Droop quotas, and therefore returns five
members; while the second party, having less than two
quotas, returns only one member. But the fairest repre-
sentation (see § 52) in this case would be four members for
the first party, and two for the second. (^^)
10. The comparison of the merits of the two quotas in
a contest between parties therefore involves an examination
of the possible number of cases in which each can give
disproportionate representation
.
In making this examination it must be assumed that
there is no cross-voting, and that each voter votes for all
the candidates of his party.
11. Fig. 1 shows the result of the comparison in a con-
test between two parties in a six-member constituency
and in a seven-member constituency.
In each case the continuous sloping line 00' represents
the strength of the parties for all values from %
to 100 % of the voters. The strength of party A is repre-
sented by the distance from OX, and the strength of party
B by the distance from O'Y .
The continuous stepped line shows what is the
best possible apportionment of members between the two
parties for each strength of each party. This apportion-
ment is obtained by dividing the strength of each party by
the Hare quota, and, in the case of remainders, giving the
last member to the party having the larger remainder
(see § 52). Thus, in the case of the six-member constit-
uency, if party .4 has just over 8J %, party B just under
91| %, of all the votes, on dividing by the Hare quota
(which is 16J% of the total votes), A will have the
larger remainder, and should therefore have one member.
As the strength of A increases, it does not become entitled
to two members until its strength reaches 25 %; from
25 % to 41§ % it is entitled to two members; and so on.
The broken lines show the representation which may be
produced by the Hare quota and the Droop quota. Where
<") Mr. J. W. McCay, in one of a series of articles on Piopf)rtional
Voting published some years ago in the Melbourne "Age," gave the fol-
lowing instance of the Droop quota as " a successful practical joker " :—
In a six-member constituency, let there be 500 voters for party J, 199 for
party B ; total 699 voters. The quota is 100, and A gets 5 seats, B 1
seat. But let A poll one more vote, making the total of tlio voter* 700.
The D.oop quota is now 101, and party A now gets only 4 seats.
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the ends of two vertical broken lines are joined by a con-
tinuous line the broken line coincides with the continuous
line
; and for the strengths corresponding to these coinciding
lines, each quota gives the correct representation of the
parties. Where there is a horizontal broken line there
may be disproportionate representation.
12. As an example consider, in the six-member constitu-
ency, the case of party A having 14 %, party B 86 %, of
the votes. Party A should have one member, party B
five members. If the Droop quota (14^%) is used, party
A will not obtain a member, and party B will get all six
members. If the Hare quota (16|%) is used, six candi-
dates of party B may each obtain more than 14 % of the
votes, and the one candidate (or the last unexcluded
candidate) of party .4 having only 14 % must be excluded,
and the six candidates of party B will be elected.
13. As another example consider, again in the six-mem-
ber constituency, the case of party .4 having 40 %, party
B 60 %, of the votes. Using the Hare quota, suppose
that three candidates of party B have been elected (thus
absorbing 50 % of the votes), and that four candidates
are left, one of party B with 10 %, and three of party A,
each with more than 10 % (and having 40 % between
them). The remaining B candidate must be excluded,
and the three A candidates elected; so that A, with only
40 % of the votes will obtain half the members, instead
of two, the number to which it is entitled. With strengths
of 40 % and 60 % this is not possible if the Droop quota
is used; although the graph shows that with A 42 %,
the Droop quota would give only two members, instead
of the three to which .4 is entitled.
14. It is to be noted that with the Hare quota the dis-
proportionate representation is due to the possibility of one
or more candidates being elected with less than the quota.
The occurrence of disproportionate representation depends,
therefore, on the distribution of votes among the unex-
cluded candidates when the last ssat is filled ; and the dis-
tribution may be such that no error can occur. With the
Droop quota, on the other hand, no candidate (on the-,
assumptions made) can be elected with less than the quota,,
and the error is due to the quota itself; and when the
parties have the appropriate strengths (for instance, 14 %
and 86 % in the example in § 12), it is certain that there
will be an error.
15. Considering the matter in symbols, let m be the
number of members to be elected ; and assume that thQ
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scrutiny has reached the stage at which the number of
candidates elected or unexcluded is w + 1.
16, Using the Hare quota, let us examine what repre-
sentation will be obtained by a party as its strength
increases from % to 100 %.
If the strength of the smaller party is less than 100 /2m,
i.e., less than half the Hare quota, it cannot obtain a
member, however the votes may be distributed among the
candidates of the other party. For if the smaller party
has only one candidate left, the other party has m, and
each of these (the surpluses of any elected candidates hav-
ing been distributed) must have more than half the Hare
quota; and any other case can be reduced to this.
If the strength, A, of the smaller party is greater than
100/2m and less than 100/w,, the smaller party is. entitled
to one m.ember. At the stage under consideration, the
smaller party will have only one candidate unexcluded, and
his votes will be A . The larger party will have m- — 1 candi-
dates, who between them will have 100 — A votes. Conse-
quently, if (100 — A)l(m — 1) is greater than A, each
of the m — 1 candidates of the larger party may have more
votes than the one candidate of the smaller party ; the
latter may be excluded, and the larger party will obtain
all the seats, instead of m — 1 seats, the number to which
it is entitled. The equation
—
A = '"" - f^ (1)m — I
therefore gives the greatest value of A for which this can
occur.
From (1) we get
—
100
m + 1
(2)
The smaller party, then, being entitled to one member,
may fail to obtain any representation, if its strength lies
between 100/2m and 100/(m + 1) ; so that the range of
strength for which disproportionate representation is pos-
sible is
—
100 1 100
m
-f 1 2 m
Similarly, the smaller party, being entitled to two mem-
bers, may obtain only one, if its strength lies between
3/2 X l60/m and (2m - l)/m x 100/m. In the same
way it may be shown that if the strength of the smaller
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party lies between 2/3 x (100 - (m - 2).100/m) and
3/2 X 100 /m, it may obtain two members, although
entitled only to one. The range of strength for which dis-
proportionate representation is possible is therefore
—
2m — 1 100 2 f 100\
m m
- (lOO - („, - 2) —
)
Proceeding in the same way for the cases in which the
smaller party is entitled to three or more members, we
obtain the following expression lor a measure of the range
of strengths for which the Hare quota may give dispro-
portionate representation :—
r 100 I
^
100-1
L/w
-f 1 2 m ^
r2m - 1 100 2 / 100\-1
L m m
Sm - 4 100 3 / . 100>r6 — , Un-|
L w — 1 m 4 V ^ m /J
1
m + \ — m
Ul \ 100 m - 1 /(m - 1) - ) - • ( 100 -
100x-|
[
m 100 2m — 1 lOOn „.
* — *
I
• • • \ "
)
m + [ m 2 m J
All such strengths are shown on the graph by the lines
marked '' H " connecting arrow-heads.
17, With the Droop quota the following expression gives
a measure of the range of strengths for which there must
be disproportionate representation :—
100 1 100\ /, 100 3 100/ ]m
Iw + 1 ~ 2 * m ) ^ \^
6 iK}V\
77Z + 1 *^ m J
/ 100 5 lOOx
.
+ ( 3 • r - i^- • ) + ...+V w + 1 2 m J
(i \^ 1^0 2m - 1 100\ ...
V^ ' m -\- \ 2 w / ^
All such strengths are shown on the graph by the lines
marked '' D " connecting arrow-heads.
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18. It is to be noted that when the Droop quota gives
disproportionate representation, it is the larger party that
is over-represented; with the Hare quota it is equally
likely that the larger party will be under-represented as
that it will be over-represented.
19. From (3) and (4) we get the following results:—
In a six-member constituency, disproportionate repre-
sentation may occur with the Hare quota for a range of
46 % of all the possible strengths of a party ; with the
Droop quota it is certain to occur with a range of 21 %.
In a seven-member constituency, disproportionate repre-
sentation may occur with the Hare quota for a range of
52 % ; with the Droop quota it is certain to occur with a
range of 19 %.
20. From Fig. 1 we can see what will be the representa-
tion for the important cases of the larger party between
50 % and 60 %.
In the six-member district, the larger party is not
entitled to four members until its strength exceeds 58J % ;
although, in the interests of party government, it might
be justifiable to say that the larger party shall have four
members even if its strength is only just over 50 %. The
figure shows that the Hare quota may give the larger party
four members if its strength exceeds 53^ % ; also that the
Hare quota may fail to give more than three members even
if the strength exceeds 58^ %. The Droop quota is certain
to give four members if the strength of the larger party
lies between 57^% and 58J%; otherwise no anomalies
are possible with this quota. {^^')
In the seven-member district, the larger party is entitled
to four members as soon as its strength exceeds 50 %.
The figure shows that the Hare quota may give only
three members if the strength lies between 50 % and 54# %,
and that it may give five members if the strength exceeds
59J %. No anomalies are possible with the Droop quota.
21. On the whole, then, the Droop quota seems to be pre-
ferable in a two-party contest; but neither the Hare nor
the Droop quota is quite S9,tisfactory. In fact a single
transferable-vote system subordinates the party to the
candidates, and in essence is not a system of proportional
representation at all ; as contrasted with list systems which
subordinate the candidate to the party and have for their
('*•) This would have occurred in the district of Franklin at the General
Election of 30th April, 1912, if the Liberal party had held during the
transfers of the scrutiny the first choices which its candidates obtained.
The strength of the Liberal party, based on the first choices, was 57'3°/o,
and the strength of the Labour party was 42"7°/o.
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primary object the return by each party of the proportion
of members to which it is entitled. (^®).
The method here used is not well suited for a com-
parison of the quotas in a contest between .nore than two
parties.
List Systems.
22. In list systems of proportional representation, the
votes obtained by the list of each party are counted, and
it is required to partition the seats for the constituency
among the parties in proportion to the strengths of the
parties; that is, in proportion to the votes for the respect-
ive lists.
We shall use the term electoral unit for the number
obtained by dividing the total of the votes for all the
candidates by the number of seats for the constituency.
The electoral unit corresponds to the Hare quota ; if each
elector has six votes, the electoral unit is six times the
tiare quota.
23. If the strength of each party is an exact i ultiple of
the electoral unit, the apportionment of seats among
parties can be carried out exactly by applying the rule-
of-three. This method, with the condition afterwards
mentioned as to the allotment of seats to the largest
remainders, is referred to as the rule-of-three method.
Usually it will be found, on dividing the strengths by the
('•) See Report of the Royal Comviission appointed to enquire into
Electoral Systems (United Kingdom, 1910, Cd. 5163).
The statistics available of the effect of the Uroop quota show that it has
produced exactly proportional representation. The following are the
actual results of the Geneial Elections in Tasmania on 3()th Ipril, 1909,
and 30th April. 1912 (in which, of course, exhaustion of votes and en ss-
votiog, possibilities excluded from the arg-ument of the paper, occurred).
Tasmania— General Elections. 30th April, 1909, and 30th April, 1912.
Proportional Representation of the Parties.
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electoral unit, that there are two or more remainders; and,,
accordingly, in order to complete the apportionment it will
be necessary to allot one or more seats to remainders less
than the electoral unit. We have then to consider how
this allotment of seats to remainders is to be effected so as
to give as nearly as may be an equality of representation
between the various parties.
•U. The following example illustrates the problem.
Assume that 10 seats are to be allotted among three
part^'es. A, B, C, whose strengths are as follows:—
Party A 16,000 votes
Party B 4,000 votes
Party C 10,000 votes
Total votes 30,000
The electoral unit is obtained by dividing 30,000, the
total of all the votes, by 10, the number of seats for the
constituency; it is therefore 3000.
The result of dividing the strength of each party by
the electoral unit is
—
Party A 5 electoral units; remainder, 1000.
Party B 1 electoral unit; remainder, 1000.
Party C 3 electoral units; remainder, 1000.
Party A, then, must have at least five members; party
B, at least one; party C, at least three; but which party is
to get the remaining seat ? If party A gets it, each 2666
votes polled for that party return a member; each 3333
votes polled for party C return a member; but there is
only one member for the 4000 votes of party B. If party
B gets the remaining seat, the corresponding numbers will
be: party A^ 3200 votes to a member; party B, 2000;
party C, 3333. If party C gets the remaining seat, the
numbers will be: party A, 3200 votes to a member; party
B, 4000; party C, 2500.
Which is the nearer approach ^o electoral equality
between the supporters of the various lists ? Probably the
first distribution, in which the larger party is favoured
in a case of doubt; but it is clear that the apportionment
of seats may often present difficulties of which the solu-
tion is not at once obvious to common sense.
25. To examine the matter more accurately, we shall
use the following notation :—
m, the number of members to be elected by the con-
stituency.
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/?, 5^, r , the strengths of the several parties
A, B,G , . . .
V, the total of all the votes polled.
Jo, 2/0 J 2^0, ... , numbers proportional to ^, q,r
and such that
—
^0 + 2/0 + 2o + ••• = ^ • • .
Q^ the electoral unit, given by
—
m
V
m
(1)
{n
. .
,
the integral parts of x^, y^, Zq
the fractional parts of .r^, i/q^ Zq .
X, Y, Z
a» 01 7» •
so that
—
i'o - A" = a, //o - y = fi, z -Z = (3)
p', q' , r . . respectively equal to XqQ, yf,Q, ZqQ . . .
2', //, 2 . . . the seats obtained by the parties with the
method of apportionment actually used.
26. The apportionment would be ideal if the rule-of-
three method could be used without allotment of seats to
remainders ; that is, if the seats obtained by the parties
were Xqj y^, Zq . . . To allot Xq, 2/o) ^0 . • seats to the
parties is equivalent to taking their strengths to be
V i 9''> ^' • instead of the actual p, q, r . . .
27. Confining ourselves to three parties, we have for
Xy y, z the equation
—
X + y + z = m (4)
This is the equation of a plane which cuts the axes of
a;, y, z, at points A, B, C equidistant from the origin.
As X, y, z are positive, the only portion of the plane to be
considered is that in the octant in which all the coordinates
are positive; this portion is the equilateral triangle ABC,
Fig. 2.
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The numbers x^ y, z are integral; and the positive
integral solutions of (4) are represented by the points of
intersection on ABC of planes drawn parallel to the
coordinate planes, and at distance 0, 1, 2 . . .m from
them. The solutions are therefore represented by the
nodes of the equilateral triangular lattice shown in Fig.
3; and their numerical values are proportional to the dis-
tances of the nodes from the sides of ABH
Fig. 3.
28. The ideal solution Xq, y^^ Zq, is represented
Ijy a point I (called the ideal point) in this triangle. If
the rule-of-three method can be used without allotment of
seats to remainders, the point / is a node. If allotment
of seats to remainders is necessary, / is not a node, and
we have to determine which of the neighbouring nodes
gives the solution.
29. Let the triangle ABC be drawn so that the perpen-
diculars from A, B, C to the opposite sides are each m.
The X, y, z of any point are then equal to the distances
of the point from the sides of ABC, that is, they
are the trilinear coordinates of the point. For
instance, the point / in Fig. 3 represents the ideal
solution in a case in which the strength of party A is
exactly five times the electoral unit, the strength of party
B, between one and two times the electoral unit; and the
strength of party C between three and four times the elec-
toral unit. Thus x^ = X = perpendicular from QR to
BG ; 2/o = perpendicular from I to AB -, Y = perpendicu
lar from PQ to AB ; (5 = perpendicular from / to PQ
;
Zq = perpendicular from 7 to ^C; ^ = perpendicular
from PR to AG
; y = perpendicular from I to PR.
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/ may be either in a small triangle (such as FQR) simi-
larly situated to ABC, or in a small triangle (such as
P'Q'R) not similarly situated to ABC. In the first case,
if we move from I to P we do not alter J or ^, but we
increase X to X + 1 ; in the second case, if we move from
I to F' we do not alter X, but we increase F to F + 1,
and Z to Z + 1; and so with the other coordinates. In
the first case, the sum of the remainders a, /3, 7, is 1, and
there is one seat to be allotted to a remainder; in the
second there are two seats to be allotted.
30. Returning to § 26, in which we saw that the
seats may be considered to be allotted as if the strength of
party A were p' in place of p; the strength of B, q' in
place of q; and the strength of C, r' in place of r, let us
first examine what will be the solution if we consider the
apportionment to be ideal when the differences between
p and p , q and q , r and r' respectively, are as small as
possible; that is, when
—
S(;/ - p)''= P . . . ,• . (5)
is a minimum.
31. Putting p = xQ, &c., and substituting from (2),
we get
—
For the minimum value of (5), ^^ = 0, and x = X
o>
2/ =" 2/oj -^ = ^0' ^^t i^ ^^is case it will not usually be pos-
sible to satisfy the further condition of the problem that
X, y, z shall each be an integer.
For other values of k^ (6) is a sphere having its centre
at {xq, 2/0, 2o)> or ^^6 ideal point 7, and intersecting ABC
in a circle whose centre is I. As k"^ increases from 0, the
sphere expands from the ideal point, and is cut by ABC
in a gradually increasing circle.
32. We now have the solution of the problem. In the
triangle ABC, plot the point / whose trilinear coordinates
are {x^, y^, z^). If x^, y^, z^ are integers (that is, if the
strength of each party is divisible without remainder by
the electoral unit), / will be a node of the lattice and the
solution is {x^, y^, z^).
If Xq, y^, Zq are not integers, we have to choose x, y, z
so that k^ is a minimum. The minimum value of k^ is
that for which the gradually increasing circle of inter-
section of ABC with the expanding sphere (6) passes
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through the nearest node of the lattice. The solution is
therefore given by the trilinear coordinates of the nearest
node. If the sum of the remainders is 1, Z is in a triangle
similarly situated to ABC, and the one unallotted seat
goes to the largBst remainder ; if the sum of the remainders
is 2, 7 is in a triangle not similarly situated to ABC, and
the two unallotted seats go to the two largest remainders,
33. The solution is therefore the same as that given by
the rule-of-three method, with the condition, in the case
of remainders, that if there is one unallotted seat it goes
to the party having the largest remainder, if two they go
to the two parties having the largest remainders. Our
discussion shows that the rule-of-three method, with this
condition, gives the correct result if the apportionment is
considered ideal when the differences between p and p
,
q and q' , r and r' , are as small aa possible.
34. The following example for a 10-member constitu-
ency illustrates the solution :—
Party A 13,000 votes.
Party B 10,500 votes.
Party C 6,500 votes.
Total votes ... 30,000
The rule-of-three method gives:-
—
Party A 4 electoral units; remainder, 1000
Party B 3 electoral units; remainder, 1500
Party C 2 electoral units; remainder, 500
With the condition that the unallotted seat goes to the
party having the largest remainder, the allotment is
:
A, 4 members ; -B, 4< ; C, 2. The point J of ¥ig. 3 is the
position of the ideal point for this case; and the nearest
node is (4, 4 2).
35. The solution gives no guidance where remainders are
equal. In such cases the solution given by the next method
shows that the unallotted seat or seats should go to the
largest party or parties.
36. A second method of discussing the problem is to
give our attention to the proportion between votes and
seats in each party instead of (as in the first discussion)
to the differences between the actual and the assumed
strengths of the parties.
Kegarded thus, the allotment may be considered ideal if
the number of votes to a member is as nearly as possible
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the same for all parties. This condition is expressible in
the form that
(- - '-)
shall be a minimum. This expression can be written in
the form
^C-^')'-*' c^)
37. For a, y, z, we now have the equation
(•!
_
™)' + 0^ - "')' +(-- -)' = A'' • • . («)\p V ^ ^q v^ \r vy
As before, the minimum value of k^ will be zero, and
then X = Xq, y = v/^, z = z^; but in this case x^ y, z will
not usually be integers.
For other values of k"^
, (8) is an ellipsoid, having its
centre at I, and intersecting ABC in an ellipse whose
centre is /. As k"^ increases from 0, the ellipsoid expands
from 7, and is cut by ABC in a gradually increasing
ellipse.
38. The solution of the problem is similar to the case of
the circle. As before, we plot the ideal point /; if this is
a node, the co-ordinates {x^^, y^^, z^) of the node are the
numbers of members for the parties.
If I is not a node, we have to select the node which is
first touched by the gradually increasing ellipse. This is
not necessarily the nearest node, and to determine which it
is we must ascertain the direction of the longer axis of the
ellipse. The direction of the longer axis may be calculated
;
but a simpler way is to project the triangle ABC so that
the ellipse becomes a circle.
39. To see the effect of this projection, change the centre
to the ideal point I ; the ellipsoid (8) is then
X* v^ z^'
—
. + „"^i + —. = *^ ^ • • (9)
•^0 yo •^0
Stretching lengths parallel to the axes in the ratios,
1 : Xq, 1 \ y^, \ : 2^, respectively, (9) becomes a circle,
and, as in § 32, the solution is given by the node nearest to
I . We have next to calculate the lengths of the sides a, h, c
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of the projected triangle ABC ', these will be found to bfr
given by
vv
X,
VI'
IIV ^,2 ^2
-,
• 02
^.2
2 ""
-^ ~0 ~9 I
(10)
.2 -V
^-l 9 9
Writing cos A, cos B, cos C in terras of a, h, c, and so
of m, ^0, 2/oj ^0, we find that each is positive, and not
greater than 1. The triangle is therefore acute; and (10)
show that the greatest side is the base from which the
co-ordinate of the greatest party is measured. One pos-
sible shape of the triangle is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4.
Other properties of the triangle are that the circum-
centre S is within the triangle ; and that if x^ is the great-
est of a?(j, 2/o, Zq, the centre of gravity G is within the
triangle MNS.
It is to be noted that areal coordinates project unaltered,
and that any line from a vertex to the opposite side is
divided by a line parallel to the base in the same ratio after
projection as before.
The region AMSN is the portion of the triangle in which
each point is nearer to A than to 5 or C; so with BLSN
and GLSM,
All these properties are true of the projection of the
small triangle in which I lies; let us now consider Fig. 4
as representing the projection of the small triangle.
40. If the small triangle is similarly situated to
the large triangle, and a, or ^^ — X, is greater than J, the
ideal point will be in the region ANM, and so
will be nearer to A than to B or (7, whatever the values of
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Voy ^0) P> y- That is, if there is only one seat to be
allotted to remainders, and one party has a remainder
greater than half the electoral unit, that party will get the
seat whatever the sizes of the parties. In a similar way we
see that if there are two seats to be allotted to remainders,
and one party has a remainder less than half the electoral
unit, the other two parties each get one seat, whatever the
sizes of the parties.
41. As the centre of gravity G, for which a = ^i = y
= ^y lies within AMSN , we see that when there are three
remainders each equal to one-third of the electoral unit,
and one unallotted seat, the largest party gets the seat
;
when there are three remainders, each equal to two-thirds
of the electoral unit, and two unallotted seats, the two
smaller parties each get a seat.
Thus Fig. 4 is drawn for the case in which x^ = 5^
I/q = IJ, Zq = 3J (see § 24). The ideal point is the centre
of gravity of the small triangle in which it lies, and also
the centre of gravity G of the projected triangle. As G is
nearer to A than to B or C, A represents the solution,
which is therefore (6, 1, 3).
42. Other properties of the figure can be written down
from inspection, but in general to ascertain what the
apportionment will be it is necessary to plot the particular
case. Certain general results can however be seen without
plotting each case. Thus taking the cases in which the
strength of party A is 53J % (x^ — 5J, when m =
10), and in which the strengths of the other parties have
all possible values from to 46| %, we should have
a series of figures similar to Fig. 4. The distance of the
ideal point from BC will always be one-third of the perpen-
dicular from A to BC The distance of A from BG varies as
//„ and Zg change ; but the path of the ideal point can be
pictured as not very different from the line described by G
as it moves across the triangle of Fig. 4 parallel to BG.
This leads to the result that when the largest party is
53 J %, and the remainders |3 and y of the other parties
are each less than half the electoral unit, the largest party
will always get the doubtful seat, except for a very small
range in which [3 is just under half the electoral unit, and
a very small range in which y is just under half the elec-
toral unit. For a further discussion of this case, see § 47.
43. In the third method of discussing the problem,
attention is again given to the number of votes to a mem-
ber, looked at in the form of the fraction of a member
returned by each vote. The apportionment is considered
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ideal when the deviation from equality in this respect is
as small as possible for each vote ; a condition expressible in
the form that
s« (f _ ^ + -y + ^v
P p -j- g + ry
or
(p'-py
(11)
shall be a minimum.
As in the second method, the analysis gives us for the
zero value of (11) the ideal point; and for values greater
than zero an ellipsoid gradually expanding from the ideal
point. As before, we project from the ideal point to
obtain a circle, and the shape of the projected triangle is
given by
—
.^=S^-_^
P P
p
V
c
P
9
V
>
(12)
The properties of this triangle can be investigated in
much the same way as before, and will be found to be
similar to those of the triangle of the second method.
Fig. 5.
Fig 5 is drawn for the case of 5\, = 5J, y^ = IJ, Zq = 3J.
Comparing this with Fig. 4, which represents this case
according to the second method, we see that the result is
much the same, but that the range for which |3 -y can be
less than half the electoral unit, without the largest party
getting the seat, is rather less than with the second method.
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The third method is not again referred to in this paper.
44. An account of the rules which have been used in
various countries for the allocation of seats to competing
lists is given by Mr. John H. Humphreys in an article in
Representation for October, 1903 (Vol. II., pp. 67-81), and
also in his work Proportional Representation (London,
1911), Chapter VIII. It seems that the rule-of-three
method, with the condition that seats not allotted to com-
plete electoral units should go to the largest remainders,
was the first to be used, when a party-list system was intro-
duced in Switzerland in 1890. This condition was after-
wards abandoned, and instead the seats not allotted to
complete electoral units were given to the largest parties,
without consideration of the size of the remainders.
45. Neither of these rules was found to be quite satis-
factory. Of the substitutes proposed the best known is
the method of Professor Victor d'PIondt of the University
of Ghent. This is embodied in the following articles of
the Bielgian Electoral Code (^^) :—
Article 263.—Le bureau principal divise sucoessivement
par 1, 2, 3j etc., le chiffre electoral de chacune des listes et
range les quotients dans I'ordre de lour importance jusqu' a
concurrence d'un nombre total de quotients egal a celui des
membres a elire. Le dernier quotient sert de diviseur
electoral.
La repartition entre les listes s'opere en attribuant a
chacune d'elles autant de sieges que son chifFre electoral com-
prend de fois ce diviseur, sauf application de Particle
264. ...
Article 264.—Lorsqu'un siege revient a titre egal a plusieurs
listes, il est attribue a celle qui a obtenu le chiffre electoral
le plus eleve et, en cas de parite des chiffres electoraux, a
la liste oij figure le candidat dont 1' election est en cause qui
a obtenu le plus de voix ou, subsidiairement, qui est le plus
age.
46. The working of the D'Hondt rules will be clear from
the following passages from Mr. J. H, Humphreys: (^*)
Let it be assumed that three lists have been presented
;
that they have obtained 8000, 7oOO, and 7000 votes respect-
ively, and that there are five vacancies to be filled. The total
number of votes for each list is divided successively by the
numbers 1^ 2, 3, and so on, and the resulting numbers are
arranged thus:—
List No. 1. List No. 2. List No. 3.
8000 ... 7500 4500
4000 ... 3750 ... 2250
2666 ... 2500 ... 1500
(") See (6), p. 15.
(8) Representation. Oct, 1908 (Vol. H., pp. 71-73), and Proportional
Representation, pp. 179-180.
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The five highest numbers (five being the number of vacancies
to be filled) are then arranged in order of magnitude, as fol-
lows :—
8000 (List No. 1).
7500 (List No. 2).
4500 (List No. 3).
400O (List No. 1).
3750 (List No. 2),
The lowest of these numbers^ 3750, is called the " common
divisor," or the " electoral quotient," and forms the base on
which the seats are allotted. The number of votes obtained
by each of the lists is divided by the common divisor, thus :—
8000 divided by 3750 = 2 with a remainder of 500.
7500 „ 3750 = 2.
4500 „ 3750 = 1 „ „ 750.
The first list contains the electoral quotient twice, the second
twice, and the third once, and the five seats are allotted
accordingly. Each party obtains one representative for every
quota of voters which it can rally to its support; all fractions
of "quotas" are disregarded, and all seats are disposed of at
the first distribution.
The method of determining the electoral quotient may
appear at first sight rather empirical, but the rule is merely
the arithmetical expression, in a form conv^enient for return-
ing officers, of the following train of reasoning : The three
lists with 8000, 7500, and 4500 supporters are competing for
seats. The first seat has to be allotted ; to which list is it to
go? Plainly to the list with 8000 supporters. Then the
second seat has to be disposed of; to which list is it to go?
If it is given to the first list, then the supporters of the first
list will have two members in all, or one member for each
4000 votes. This would be unfair while 7500 supporters of
the second list are unrepresented, therefore the second seat
is allotted to the list with 7500 supporters. Similar reason-
ing will give the third seat to the list with 4500 supporters, the
fourth to the list with 8000 supporters (which now will rightly
have one representative for each 4000), and the fifth to the
list with 7500. The question in each case is to what list
must the seat be allotted in such a way that no one group
of unrepresented electors is larger than a represented group.
The separate allotment of seats one by one in accordance with
the foregoing reasoning may be shown thus :
—
8000 (List No. 1).
7500 (List No. 2).
4500 (List No. 3).
4000 (List No. 1).
3750 (List No. 2).
This result, of course, agrees with that obtained by the
official process of dividing the total of each list by the
electoral quotient.
The d'Hondt rule certainly accomplishes its purpose. It
furnishes a measuring rod by which to measure off from each
total of votes the number of seats won by the list. But the
d'Hondt rule is not without its critics. As in the earlier
Swiss methods objection was taken to the undue favouring of
certain fractions, so in Belgium, objection is taken to the fact
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that remainders are not taken into account at all. The
Belgian rule works to the advantage of
_
the largest party, a
fact that many may consider as a point in its favour. A fur-
ther simple example will show the force of this statement.
Assume that 11 seats are being contested by three parties,
whose votes are as follows :—
Party A 6000 votes
Party B 4800 votes
Party C 1900 votes
Total 13,700
Arrange these numbers in a line and divide successively by
1, 2, 3, and so on, thus :
—
'artv A.
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Party-Lut System hi Three-yarty^^ Contest in lO-member
Co7ixtifuency.
-
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Party- LUt System in Three-party Contest in 1} -member
Constituency.
(Size of Larp;est Party, 53^ °/o.)
Second
Party.
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51. The rules for a three-party contest in a constituency
returning an even number of members would then be :—
I. Divide the total of the votes for each list by the elec-
toral unit (§ 22). For each whole electoral unit contained
in the votes for a list allocate a seat to the list.
II. If the largest party has between 50 per cent, and
60 per cent, of all the votes, give it one more seat than
the number it obtains under I.
III. Subject to Rule II., allocate the one seat or the
two seats remaining to the party or parties having the
largest remainder or remainders.
If the constituency returned an odd number of mem-
.
bers, use Rules I. and III. only.
52. In a contest between two parties, each of the methods
will give the same result; and Rules I. to III. above will
be used.
53. It is to be noted in conclusion that the differences
described in this paper between the various systems and
the various quotas are only minor matters, though import-
ant in deciding between the various methods of securing
proportional representation ; and the discussion of them
should not be allowed to distract attention from the sub-
stantial advantages which any system of proportional
representation has over any non-proportional system.
In the preparation of this paper, I have been much
indebted to Professor A. McAulay and Mr. L. F. Giblin
for advice and criticism.
